Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal
Volume 12

Issue 1

Article 2

2-8-2013

Mediation Confidentiality: For California Litigants, Why Should
Mediation Confidentiality be a Function of the Court in Which the
Litigation is Pending?
Rebecca Callahan

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Courts Commons, Dispute Resolution and Arbitration
Commons, and the Evidence Commons

Recommended Citation
Rebecca Callahan, Mediation Confidentiality: For California Litigants, Why Should Mediation
Confidentiality be a Function of the Court in Which the Litigation is Pending?, 12 Pepp. Disp. Resol. L.J.
Iss. 1 (2013)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol12/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal by an authorized
editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

Callahan: Mediation Confidentiality: For California Litigants, Why Should M

[Vol. 12: 63, 2012]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

Mediation Confidentiality: For
California Litigants, Why Should
Mediation Confidentiality be a
Function of the Court in Which the
Litigation is Pending?
Rebecca Callahan*

I.

OVERVIEW

In opening a mediation session, it is fairly routine for the mediator to
promise comprehensive confidentiality to the participants. 1 While there are
a number of statutes, rules, and cases that support confidentiality in
mediation,2 a certain amount of skepticism and concern exists regarding the
scope of protection that actually exists.3 The uncertainty about the nature

* Rebecca Callahan is an independent mediator and arbitrator in Newport Beach, California. Ms.
Callahan received her J.D. from the University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall) and her B.A.
from the University of Southern California. In 2007, she received an LL.M. in Dispute Resolution
from Pepperdine University School of Law, Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution. Ms. Callahan is
on the mediation and commercial arbitration panels of the American Arbitration Association and is
an adjunct professor at Pepperdine University School of Law where she teaches Mediation Theory
and Practice. Ms. Callahan frequently speaks and writes on various dispute resolution topics. Her
most recent publications include What to Do when Insolvency Becomes an Issue in Mediation, 14
CONFLICT MGMT. (ABA SEC. LITIG.), Issue 2, Winter/Spring 2010 (Part 1) and 14 C ONFLICT
MGMT. (ABA SEC. LITIG.), Issue 3, Summer/Fall 2010 (Part 2); Truth or Dare: California’s New
Ethics Standards for Private Arbitrators, 18 BUS. L. NEWS, Issue 1, 2008; and California’s New
Ethics Standards: A Hot Bed of Controversy and Conflicting Decisions, 5 J. AM. ARB. 295 (2006).
Ms. Callahan is a past president of The Peter M. Elliott American Inn of Court and is the current
Chair-elect of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Section of the Orange County Bar Association.
1. Indeed, in the context of an attorney–mediator’s ethical obligations, some courts have
charged attorney–mediators with the obligation to receive and preserve confidences in much the
same manner as the attorney–client privilege. See Poly Software Int’l, Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487
(D. Utah 1995) (law firm disqualified when one of the firm’s attorneys had served as a mediator in
the litigated matter); McKenzie Constr. v. St. Croix Storage Corp., 961 F. Supp. 857 (D.V.I. 1997).
2. See infra Part III.
3. See infra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
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and extent of what confidentiality protections exist for things said in
mediation is especially apparent in federal court litigation disputes. 4 As
discussed below, the scope of protection available under California law is
quite broad as compared to that available under federal law which is unclear
and minimal at best.
Scholars have recognized that “as a legal matter, there is still
considerable uncertainty about the extent to which communications made
during the process of mediating a dispute are protected from disclosure in
subsequent legal proceedings.” 5 One authority has opined that “[c]urrently,
it is not an overstatement to say that no mediator or counsel in the country
can, with confidence, predict the extent to which it will be possible to
maintain the confidentiality of a mediation.”6
As discussed below, both state and federal courts recognize that a
theoretical component of mediation is confidentiality. While California has
express statutory provisions that provide for confidentiality protections, and
numerous Supreme Court of California decisions endorse those protections,
no similar protections are available under federal law.7 Therefore, the
confidentiality protections afforded California litigants with respect to
communications had in mediation may depend on whether litigation is
pending or ultimately filed in state or federal court. Because mediation is a
nonjudicial alternative to litigation in the courts, the question posed by this
article is: Why should mediation confidentiality depend upon (a) whether the
dispute has escalated to the point of litigation, and (b) whether that litigation
is pending in state or federal court?8
II. CONFIDENTIALITY AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF MEDIATION
The inclusion of confidentiality as a defining feature of mediation
comes from its theoretical underpinnings. “The salient features of mediation
4. See infra Part IV; see also D WIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL D ISPUTES 218-220
(2009); Dennis Sharp, The Many Faces of Mediation Confidentiality, in HANDBOOK ON MEDIATION
223-236 (2d ed. 2010).
5. See Kenneth R. Feinberg, Mediation—A Preferred Method of Dispute Resolution, 16 PEPP.
L. REV. S5, 28 (1989); Note, Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 441, 44647 (1984); see also Lawrence R. Freedman & Michael L. Pigroff, Confidentiality in Mediation: The
Need for Protection, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON D ISP. RESOL. 37 (1986).
6. Ellen E. Deason, Predictable Mediation Confidentiality in the U.S. Federal System, 17
OHIO ST. J. D ISP. RESOL. 239, 241 (2002).
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See discussion infra Part III (California statutory law makes communications in mediation
inadmissible as evidence in any legal proceeding); Part IV (no similar counterpart exists under
federal law). Therefore, a California litigant bears the risk that statements made or writings prepared
during mediation of a state court dispute may become admissible as evidence in a subsequent or
related federal court action.

64

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol12/iss1/2

2

Callahan: Mediation Confidentiality: For California Litigants, Why Should M

[Vol. 12: 63, 2012]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

are an informal process, a neutral mediator without authority to command a
result, disputants who participate voluntarily and settle of their own accord,
and . . . confidentiality of mediation communications.” 9 Some have said that
confidentiality is vital to mediation because compromised negotiations often
require parties to reveal deep-seated feelings or sensitive issues or to make
admissions and concessions which would be “impossible if the parties were
constantly looking over their shoulders.”10 Problem-solving discussions are
a key part of negotiations and require the parties to provide reasons and
explanations for their proposals, assumptions, and expectations, which might
require the exchange of personal, proprietary, or otherwise confidential
information in order for these discussions to be successful. 11 Because
mediation is nonbinding and can only result in a settlement if and to the
extent that the disputants agree to a negotiated resolution, parties have
legitimate reasons for being concerned that statements made in an effort to
resolve a dispute might be used against them should a full settlement not be
achieved.12
There is general agreement that mediation is a communication process
in which the goal is a negotiated resolution of a dispute, or at least progress
towards that end, with the mediator being tasked with the job of facilitating
constructive dialogue between or among disputants. 13 The willingness of the
9. Alan Kirtley, The Mediation Privilege’s Transition from Theory to Implementation:
Designing a Mediation Privilege Standard to Protect Mediation Participants, the Process, and the
Public, 1995 J. D ISP. RESOL. 1, 6 (1995); see also JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., MEDIATION THEORY
AND PRACTICE 205 (2d ed. 2006) (“Confidentiality is generally considered to be an essential
ingredient in mediation.”); Sharp, supra note 4, at 223 (“Confidentiality is one of the keys to the
acceptability and success of mediation among parties to a dispute.”).
10. Michael L. Prigoff, Toward Candor or Chaos: The Case of Confidentiality in Mediation,
12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 103 (1988).
11. ALFINI, supra note 9, at 133, 205-06.
12. Sharp, supra note 4, at 225.
13. See SUZANNE MCCORKLE & MELANIE J. REESE, MEDIATION THEORY & PRACTICE 33
(2005).
Mediators listen to the disputants’ stories, allow them to vent their frustrations, validate
each person’s worth and feelings, and provide appropriate feedback. Mediators are
conduits of information. They allow parties to share information with each other and
enable parties to understand each other’s perspective. Mediators keep communication
focused on important and relevant issues. They help disputants discover and express
their own interests and goals. Mediators are links to additional expertise, data, or
resources that may be required to settle a dispute. They know the services available in
their community and assist the parties to determine if outside, objective data are required.
Mediators are boundary keepers when they frame issues, moderate emotions, and contain
the conflict within a productive range.
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parties to “open up” is critical to the mediator’s ability to engage parties in
the problem-solving and negotiation aspects of mediation. 14 As one
authority put it, “Mediation is a communication process; solving legal
problems is simply a byproduct.”15
III. CALIFORNIA’S STRICT CONFIDENTIALITY SCHEME
California favors settlement of civil disputes, as evidenced by the
enactment of Code of Civil Procedure section 1775, which states that “[t]he
peaceful resolution of disputes in a fair, timely, appropriate, and costeffective manner is an essential function of the judicial branch of state
government . . . .”16 To effectuate this policy, the state legislature has
expressly validated mediation as a process that “provides parties with a
simplified and economical procedure for obtaining prompt and equitable
resolution of their disputes and a great opportunity to participate directly in
resolving these disputes.”17 Because mediation provides a simple, quick,
and economical means of resolving disputes, and because it may also help
reduce the court system’s backlog of cases, California has recognized that
the public has an interest in protecting not only mediation participants, but
also the mediation process itself.18
A. What Qualifies as a “Mediation” for Purposes of Confidentiality
Protection?
The starting point for California’s mediation confidentiality scheme is
Evidence Code section 1115, which defines the processes that qualify for
confidentiality protection. 19 This protection extends to “mediations” and
“mediation consultations.”20 A mediation consultation is defined as “a
communication between a person and a mediator for the purpose of
initiating, considering, or reconvening a mediation or retaining the
mediator.”21 Mediation is defined as “a process in which a neutral person or
persons facilitate communication between the disputants to assist them in

Id.
14. Kirtley, supra note 9, at 6.
15. Kent L. Brown, Comment, Confidentiality in Mediation: Status and Implications, 1991 J.
DISP. RESOL. 307, 309 (1991).
16. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1775(a) (West 2011).
17. Id. § 1775(c).
18. See Rojas v. Superior Court, 93 P.3d 260, 264-65 (Cal. 2004).
19. See CAL. EVID. C ODE § 1115 (West 2011).
20. Id. § 1115(a), (c).
21. Id. § 1115(c).
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reaching a mutually acceptable agreement.” 22 The comments to section
1115 make it clear that what qualifies as a mediation is to be determined by
“the nature of a proceeding, not its label,” and that a proceeding might
qualify as a mediation for purposes of the confidentiality protections “even
though it is denominated differently.” 23 The fact that a court may use the
terms “mediation” and “settlement” interchangeably when referring to the
process taking place or the fact that a judicial officer might be assigned to
preside over the talks will not transform the proceeding into a mandatory
settlement conference without a clear record that such a conference was
ordered.24 This is an important distinction because Evidence Code section
1117(b)(2) provides that the confidentiality protections afforded to
communications in mediation do not apply to communications during a
mandatory settlement conference convened pursuant to rule 3.1380 of the
California Rules of Court. 25
The Archdiocese Case is an example of how broadly courts have
construed what qualifies as a mediation for purposes of affording
confidentiality protection to facilitated settlement discussions. 26 In the
Archdiocese Case, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Los Angeles had been
named as the principal defendant in nearly 500 lawsuits based upon
allegations that various priests had committed acts of childhood sexual
molestation on the plaintiffs. 27 The court appointed a judge to facilitate
“settlement and mediation” among the parties. 28 As part of that process, the
church prepared “written summaries of its personnel and other files
concerning more than 100 priests who had been identified as molesters” and
submitted them to the settlement judge for use in his settlement and
mediation efforts.29 The church stated that it planned to release the
summaries publicly once they were completed. 30 In response, some of the
accused priests filed a motion for protective order to bar public disclosure of
22. Id. § 1115(a).
23. Id. § 1115(a) cmt. (1997).
24. See Doe 1 v. Superior Court (Archdiocese Case), 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 248, 252 (Ct. App.
2005) (“Except where the parties have expressly agreed otherwise, appellate courts should not seize
on an occasional reference to ‘settlement’ as a means to frustrate the mediation confidentiality
statutes.”).
25. CAL. EVID. C ODE § 1117 (West 2010).
26. See Archdiocese Case, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 248.
27. See id. at 249-50.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1164.
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the written summaries. 31 In addition to privacy and privilege issues, the
priests argued that the proposed release violated the mediation
confidentiality protections afforded by the Evidence Code.32 The trial court
denied the motion and the accused priests filed a petition for writ of mandate
to reverse the trial court’s order and stop any public disclosure of the
summaries.33 The court of appeal granted the petition, holding that
disclosure of the summaries was barred by the mediation confidentiality
privilege.34
B. What is Protected?
Confidentiality protection is provided not in the form of an evidentiary
privilege, but rather in the form of an evidence exclusion provision. 35 As
evidence in a court proceeding, Evidence Code section 1119 bars disclosure
of (a) ”anything said or any admission made for the purpose of, in the course
of, or pursuant to, a mediation or a mediation consultation”;36 (b) any writing
“prepared for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation or
a mediation consultation”;37 and (c) ”[a]ll communications, negotiations, or
settlement discussions by and between participants in the course of a
mediation or a mediation consultation . . . .”38 The Supreme Court of
California has confirmed on several occasions that “any” and “all”
provisions of section 1119 are to be interpreted quite literally and made it
clear that the scope of protection intended by the statute is unqualified, clear,
absolute,39 and is not subject to judicially crafted exceptions or limitations.40
The facts of the cases in which the Supreme Court of California has been
called upon to rule about the scope of protection afforded by section 1119
have been somewhat extreme and serve to illustrate the breadth of what will
be held as confidential if the communications—and sometimes conduct—
occurred during a mediation. 41
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1173-74.
35. See CAL. EVID. C ODE § 1119 (West 2011).
36. Id. § 1119(a) (emphasis added).
37. Id. § 1119(b) (emphasis added).
38. Id. § 1119(c) (emphasis added).
39. See, e.g., Foxgate Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 25 P.3d 1117, 1126 (Cal.
2001); Rojas v. Superior Court, 93 P.3d 260, 207 (Cal. 2004); Fair v. Bakhtiari, 147 P.3d 653, 65859 (Cal. 2006).
40. See, e.g., Simmons v. Ghaderi, 187 P.3d 934, 945-46 (Cal. 2008); Cassel v. Superior
Court, 244 P.3d 1080, 1087-88 (Cal. 2011).
41. See infra Parts III.B.1–4.
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1. Foxgate Decision (2001)
In 2001, the Supreme Court of California first addressed this issue in
Foxgate.42 This case discusses party conduct and statements made during
mediation with respect to one party’s nonparticipation—rather than the
exchange of information or offers during the course of a mediation. 43 The
case concerned a construction defect claim for a sixty-five-unit
condominium complex. 44 A special master appointed by the superior court
to mediate and rule on discovery motions ordered the parties to mediation,
and the court’s notice instructed that the parties were required to bring their
experts and claims representatives. 45 Five days of mediation were
reserved.46 On the first day of mediation, plaintiff’s attorney appeared with
nine experts, while defendants’ attorney arrived late and with zero experts
because, he believed, due to his knowledge in the field of construction defect
litigation, he did not need experts to engage in discourse with plaintiff’s
experts.47 After the morning of the first mediation session, the mediator
cancelled the subsequent mediation sessions because he concluded they
could not proceed without defense experts. 48 Plaintiff then moved for
sanctions against defendants and their attorney for failure to participate in
good faith in a court-ordered mediation and to comply with the order to
mediate.49
Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions concluded with a
recommendation that defendants and their counsel should be ordered to
reimburse the plaintiff for expenses incurred in the mediation. 50 Also
attached to the sanctions motion was a declaration by plaintiff’s counsel
reciting statements made by defendants’ counsel during the mediation. 51
The mediator also filed a report “recommend[ing] . . . that [defendants and
42. See Foxgate, 25 P.3d 1117.
43. Id. at 1119-20.
44. Id. at 1120.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. The sanctions sought reflected the cost to plaintiff from counsel’s preparation for the
sessions, the charge of plaintiff’s nine experts for preparation and appearance at the mediation
session, and the payments to the mediator which was no longer refundable. Id. Plaintiff’s
memorandum of points and authorities and declaration of counsel in support of the motion for
sanctions recited a series of actions by Bramalea and Stevenson, that plaintiff asserted, reflected a
pattern of tactics pursued in bad faith and solely intended to cause unnecessary delay. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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their attorney] be ordered to reimburse all parties for expenses incurred as a
result of the cancelled . . . mediation sessions.”52 In granting the sanctions
motion, the trial court considered the mediator’s report and the declaration
of plaintiff’s counsel regarding what occurred during the mediation over
defendants’ objection. 53
The court of appeal reversed the trial court’s sanction order and
remanded the matter back to the trial court to make specific findings
regarding the conduct or circumstances justifying the sanctions order.54 The
court of appeal rejected defendants’ argument that the mediator was barred
by Evidence Code section 1121 from making a report to the court that
commented on party conduct during the mediation, reasoning that the
confidentiality mandated by Evidence Code section 1119 should be balanced
against the policy recognizing that, unless the parties and their attorneys
participate in good faith in mediation, there is little to protect. 55 The
Supreme Court of California affirmed the court of appeal’s reversal of the
sanctions order, but held that if, on remand, the plaintiff elected to pursue a
sanctions motion, no evidence of communications made during the
mediation could be admitted or considered. 56 In this regard, the supreme
court specifically rejected the notion that there is any need for judicial
construction of Evidence Code sections 1119 or 1121, or that a judicially
crafted exception to mediation confidentiality was necessary.57 The court
reasoned that “[t]he statutes are clear. Section 1119 prohibits any person,
mediator and participants alike, from revealing any written or oral
communication made during a mediation.”58 The supreme court noted,
however, that while Evidence Code section 1121 prohibits the mediator from
advising the court about conduct during a mediation, it does not prohibit a
party from so advising the court. 59

52. Id. at 1121.
53. Id. at 1122.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1125.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1125-26.
58. Id. at 1126.
59. Id. The supreme court specifically held that a mediator may not reveal communications
made during a mediation and that there are no exceptions to the statutory limits on the content of a
mediator’s report as provided by Evidence Code section 1121. Id.
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2. Rojas Decision (2004)
In 2004, the Supreme Court of California next addressed this issue
Rojas.60 This case involved the confidentiality of information developed and
prepared for use in mediation. 61 Rojas also involves construction defect
claims in which the owner of the apartment complex complained that the
water leakage due to the construction defects had produced toxic molds on
the property requiring its complete demolition. 62 The court in Rojas issued a
case management order which provided that evidence of anything said and
any document prepared for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to
any mediation would be privileged pursuant to Evidence Code section 1119
and not admissible as evidence at trial.63 The litigation between the owner
and the contractors who built the complex was settled through mediation. 64
Following the settlement, several hundred tenants sued the owner and
builder for damages resulting from health problems alleged to be the result
of the mold infestation. 65 In discovery, the tenants sought to compel
production of the materials developed and prepared for use in the earlier
owner–builder mediation. 66 The tenants argued that this discovery should be
ordered because there was no other evidence of the condition of the building
before its demolition and repair.67 The trial court denied the motion under
Evidence Code section 1119 because the materials sought were created in
connection with the mediation in the earlier case. 68 On appeal, the court of
appeal reversed, finding that “section 1119 does ‘not protect pure evidence,’
but protects only ‘the substance of mediation . . . .’”69 The Supreme Court
of California then reversed and held that: (a) the mediation privilege for
“writings” covered witness statements, analysis of raw test data, and
photographs prepared during the mediation; (b) the mediation privilege was
not subject to a “good cause” exception; and (c) the evidence exclusion

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See Rojas v. Superior Court, 93 P.3d 260, 262 (Cal. 2004).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 262-63.
Id. at 263.
Id.
Id.
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provisions operated as a bar to discovery of such communications and
materials.70 The court reasoned:
In Foxgate, we stated that “[t]o carry out the purpose of encouraging mediation by
ensuring confidentiality, [our] statutory scheme . . . unqualifiedly bars disclosure of”
specified communications and writings associated with a mediation “absent an express
statutory exception.” We also found that the “judicially crafted exception” to section
1119 there at issue was “not necessary either to carry out the legislative intent or to avoid
71
an absurd result.” We reach the same conclusion here . . . .

3. Simmons Decision (2008)
In 2008, the Supreme Court of California next addressed this issue in
Simmons.72 This case involved a “gaming” tactic that one party used against
the other during negotiations had in a mediation. 73 Simmons involves
wrongful death and medical malpractice claims against a doctor brought by
the patient’s mother and son. 74 The parties went to mediation. 75 Before
beginning settlement negotiations, the defendant doctor executed a standard
consent-to-settlement agreement which authorized her insurance claims
specialist to negotiate on her behalf up to a defined settlement value capped
at $125,000.76 Plaintiffs and their counsel then engaged in settlement
discussions with the claims specialist and defense attorney hired by the
insurance company, while the defendant doctor and her personal attorney
waited in another room. 77 At some point during these negotiations, the
insurance company offered $125,000 and plaintiffs orally accepted the
offer.78 The settlement terms were then stated in a term sheet document for
the parties to sign before leaving the mediation. 79 At this juncture, the
defendant doctor revoked the settlement authorization she had given to her
insurance claims specialist and refused to sign the term sheet
memorandum.80 Plaintiffs then amended their complaint to add a cause of
action for breach of contract, alleging that the defendant doctor had breached

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id. at 271 (internal citation omitted).
Simmons v. Ghanderi, 187 P.3d 934, 936 (Cal. 2008).
Id. at 936.
Id.
Id. at 937.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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an oral agreement to settle at $125,000.81 At trial, the defendant doctor
asserted that Evidence Code section 1119 precluded plaintiffs from proving
the existence of an oral agreement and objected to the admissibility of the
consent-to-settle agreement, the term sheet memorandum, and other
evidence offered with respect to the events at the mediation—including a
declaration by the mediator.82 The trial court overruled defendant’s
objections and found that plaintiffs and defendant’s agent—the claims
specialist—had entered into a valid and enforceable oral contract before
defendant withdrew her consent. 83 The trial court ordered specific
performance and entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs for $125,000.84 The
defendant doctor appealed.85
On appeal, the court of appeal affirmed the judgment, finding that a
valid oral agreement had been reached during the mediation. 86 The court of
appeal found that during pretrial motions, both defendant and plaintiffs had
presented evidence of the occurrences at the mediation and defendant had
failed to object to plaintiffs’ proffered evidence with respect to such
motions.87 Accordingly, the court of appeal found that the defendant doctor
was estopped from asserting mediation confidentiality at trial to bar
admission of the mediation evidence.88 The Supreme Court of California
disagreed and reversed, holding that the court of appeal had improperly
relied on the doctrine of estoppel to create a judicial exception to the
statutory requirements of mediation confidentiality as provided by Evidence
Code section 1119.89 Here, the court reasoned:
Both the clear language of the mediation statutes and our prior rulings support the
preclusion of an implied waiver exception. The legislature chose to promote mediation
by ensuring confidentiality rather than adopt a scheme to ensure good behavior in the
mediation and litigation process.
The mediation statutes provide clear and
90
comprehensive rules reflecting that policy choice.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 938.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 936.
Id. at 946.
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4. Cassel Decision (2011)
The fourth and most recent Supreme Court of California case regarding
this issue was the 2011 decision in Cassel.91 This case involved private
attorney–client conversations during the course of a mediation. 92 Prior to
attending the mediation, Michael Cassel met with his attorneys from
Wasserman, Comden, Casselman & Pearson to discuss mediation strategy
and, at that time, agreed that Cassel would accept no less than $2 million
from defendant to settle the lawsuit. 93 After several hours of mediation,
Cassel was told that defendant would pay no more than $1.25 million. 94
Although Cassel felt tired, hungry, and ill, his attorneys insisted that Cassel
remain until the mediation was concluded and pressed him to accept the
offer, telling him that he was “greedy” to insist on more. 95 At one point,
Cassel left to have dinner and consult with his family. 96 His attorneys called
and insisted that he return to the mediation, at which time they threatened to
abandon him at the imminently pending trial, misrepresented certain
significant terms of the proposed settlement, and falsely assured him they
could and would negotiate a side deal that would recoup the deficits in the
settlement.97 They also falsely stated that they would waive or discount a
large portion of the $188,000 legal bill if he accepted the settlement offer. 98
Finally, at midnight, after fourteen hours of mediation, when he was
exhausted and unable to think clearly, Cassel’s attorneys presented him with
a written draft settlement agreement and evaded his questions about its
complicated terms.99 Believing he had no other choice, Cassel signed the
agreement.100 After settling the business litigation dispute, Cassel then sued
his attorneys for malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and breach of
contract.101 Prior to trial in the malpractice action, Cassel’s attorneys moved
to exclude all evidence of any discussions they had with plaintiff
immediately preceding and during the mediation concerning settlement
strategies and the attorneys’ efforts to persuade plaintiff to reach a settlement

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Cassel v. Superior Court, 244 P.3d 1080 (Cal. 2011).
Id. at 1083-84.
Id. at 1085.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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in the mediation. 102 The trial granted the attorneys’ motion excluding the
evidence of their mediation communications with their client. 103
On appeal, the court of appeal reversed the decision. 104 The court of
appeal reasoned that the mediation confidentiality statutes were intended to
prevent damaging use against a mediation disputant of tactics employed,
positions taken, or confidences exchanged in the mediation, and were not
intended to protect attorneys from malpractice claims by their own clients
based on advice and other communications made by counsel. 105 The court of
appeal concluded that an attorney sued for malpractice cannot use mediation
confidentiality as a shield to exclude damaging evidence of private attorney–
client conversations during the mediation. 106 On further appeal, the Supreme
Court of California reversed, finding that the mediation confidentiality
statutes must be strictly applied and do not permit judicially created
exceptions or limitations even where competing public policies may be
affected.107 The court reasoned:
Here, as in Foxgate, Rojas, Fair, and Simmons, the plain language of the mediation
confidentiality statutes controls our result. . . . Section 1119, subdivision (a), extends to
oral communications made for the purpose of or pursuant to a mediation, not just to oral
communications made in the course of the mediation.
The obvious purpose of the expanded language is to ensure that the statutory protection
extends beyond discussions carried out directly between opposing parties to the dispute,
or with the mediator . . . . All oral or written communications are covered, if they are
made “for the purpose of” or “pursuant to” a mediation. It follows that, absent an express
statutory exception, all discussions conducted in preparation for a mediation, as well as
all mediation-related communications that take place during the mediation itself, are
protected from disclosure. Plainly, such communications include those between a
mediation disputant and his or her own counsel, even if these do not occur in the presence
108
of the mediator or other disputants.

The Cassel decision has been highly criticized from a legal ethics and
legal malpractice standpoint for giving attorneys a free pass for “settlement
102. Id. at 1083.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1084.
106. Id. at 1085.
107. Id. at 1087.
108. Id. at 1090-91 (internal citations omitted); c.f. Porter v. Wyner, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 653 (Ct.
App. 2010) (statements made between plaintiff’s attorney and defendant’s attorney purportedly
causing plaintiff to lower his settlement demand were not protected from discovery in plaintiff’s
subsequent legal malpractice action because there was no evidence that the statements were made for
the purpose of or pursuant to a mediation).
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malpractice” if it occurs in the context of mediation. 109 Nevertheless, the
Cassel decision demonstrates just how broadly the scope of the mediation
confidentiality statutes will be construed by the Supreme Court of California
because of the unqualified language of the statute. As with the earlier cases,
the supreme court has stated that it is up to the legislature, not the courts, to
define the contours of mediation confidentiality and acceptable and
nonacceptable conduct in mediation. 110
C. Special Rules Related to Mediators
Evidence Code section 1121 provides that unless the parties agree
otherwise, the court may not consider any “report, assessment, evaluation,
recommendation or finding of any kind” by a mediator concerning a
mediation, the only report a mediator may make is one that simply states
whether an agreement was reached. 111 The comments to section 1121
explain that the rationale behind this statutory provision is aimed at making
sure a mediator will “not be able to influence the result of a mediation or
adjudication by reporting or threatening to report to the decision maker on
the merits of the dispute or reasons why mediation failed to resolve it.”112
The companion to section 1121 is Evidence Code section 703.5, which
declares that a mediator shall be incompetent to testify as to any statement,
conduct, decision, or ruling occurring in or in conjunction with a mediation
that she conducted.113
The broad prohibition against mediators making a report of any kind to
the court—beyond the statement that a settlement was or was not reached—
does not prohibit a party from advising the court about conduct during the
mediation that might warrant sanctions. 114 In Foxgate, plaintiff attached a
report by the mediator and a declaration by plaintiff’s counsel reciting
statements made during the mediation session, which the Supreme Court of
California found was prohibited by Evidence Code sections 1119 and

109. Robert K. Sall, Ethical Concerns Regarding Mediation Confidentiality and the
Implications of Cassel, ORANGE COUNTY LAWYER, Apr. 2011, at 42-45; Diane Karpman, High
Court Holds Lawyers are Not Accountable for Misconduct During Mediation, CALIFORNIA BAR
JOURNAL (Feb. 2011),
http://www.calbarjournal.com/February2011/Attorneydiscipline/EthicsByte.aspx.
110. In this regard, the supreme court noted that when the mediation confidentiality statutes
apply, they are unqualified absent express statutory exception and must be applied “in strict
accordance with their plain terms.” Cassel, 244 P.3d at 1087.
111. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1121 (West 2011).
112. Id. § 1121 cmt. (1997).
113. Id. § 703.5.
114. Foxgate Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 25 P.3d 1117, 1128 (Cal. 2001).
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1121.115 However, the supreme court noted that to the extent the declaration
of plaintiff’s counsel stated that the mediator had ordered the parties to be
present with their experts, there was no violation because “neither section
1119 nor section 1121 prohibits a party from revealing or reporting to the
court about noncommunicative conduct, including violation of the orders of
a mediator or the court during the mediation.” 116 In 2008, the California
Court of Appeal for the Third District relied on Foxgate to find that the
failure to have all persons or representatives attend court-ordered
mediation—as required by local rules—was “conduct that a party, but not a
mediator, may report to the court as a basis for monetary sanctions.” 117
Similarly, in 2010, the California Court of Appeal for the Second District
upheld an order imposing sanctions for the unauthorized failure of a party to
attend a court-ordered mediation.118
D. Special Rules Related to Written Settlement Agreements Reached in
Mediation
While the ultimate goal in mediation is for the parties to reach
agreement on terms to resolve their dispute, a written settlement agreement
or term sheet memorandum prepared with respect to the settlement is a
writing prepared during the course of mediation and, as such, is entitled to
exclusionary protection under Evidence Code section 1119.119 Pursuant to
section 1123, such writings shall not be inadmissible or protected from
disclosure if any of the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) The agreement provides that it is admissible or subject to disclosure, or words to that
120
effect.
121
(b) The agreement provides that it is enforceable or binding or words to that effect.
122
(c) All parties to the agreement expressly agree in writing . . . to its disclosure.
(d) The agreement is used to show fraud, duress, or illegality that is relevant to an issue
123
in dispute.

115. Id.
116. Id. at 1128 n.14.
117. Campagnone v. Enjoyable Pools & Spas Serv. & Repairs, Inc., 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 551, 555
(Ct. App. 2008). The court of appeal went on to note, however, that reporting on anything more than
a party’s non-attendance might violate the confidentiality rules. Id.
118. See Ellerbee v. County of L.A., 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 756, 763 (Ct. App. 2010).
119. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1119 (West 2011).
120. Id. § 1123(a).
121. Id. § 1123(b).
122. Id. § 1123(c).

77

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2013

15

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 2

In 2006, the Supreme Court of California had occasion to construe the
application of Evidence Code section 1123 and interpreted it quite strictly
and literally.124 In Fair, the parties to a civil dispute mediated their disputes
over the course of a two-day period.125 At the end of the second day,
plaintiff’s counsel drafted a handwritten memorandum which set forth the
settlement terms the parties had agreed to, including an arbitration clause for
any and all future disputes that might arise between the parties. 126
Postmediation, the parties exchanged formal settlement agreements, but
were ultimately unable to reach agreement on the terms for a final written
settlement agreement. 127 Plaintiff then demanded arbitration under the
arbitration clause included in the term sheet memorandum. 128 Defendant
rejected the demand and contended that the term sheet memorandum was
inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1119(b) because it represented a
writing prepared in the course of a mediation. 129 Plaintiff then moved to
compel arbitration pursuant to the term sheet memorandum. 130 Defendant
opposed the motion and objected to the admission of the term sheet
memorandum and parts of plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration which referred to
discussions at the mediation under Evidence Code section 1119. 131 The trial
court sustained defendant’s objection and excluded the term sheet and
portions of plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration under section 1119 on the
grounds that the declaration failed to meet the requirements of Evidence
Code section 1123.132
On appeal, the court of appeal reversed, holding that the inclusion of the
provision providing for any and all disputes to be submitted to arbitration
could only mean that the parties intended the term sheet to be enforceable
and binding.133 On further appeal to the Supreme Court of California, the
court reversed and held that the court of appeal had erred by concluding that
the inclusion of an arbitration clause satisfied the requirements of Evidence
Code section 1123(b).134 The supreme court noted that, although the
legislature had not provided the courts with a “bright line” rule regarding

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. § 1123(d).
See Fair v. Bakhtiari, 147 P.3d 653, 654 (Cal. 2006).
Id. at 655.
Id. at 654-55.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 194.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 197-98.
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what would qualify as “words to that effect” as a substitute for an express
statement that the agreement was intended to be enforceable and binding, “a
narrow interpretation of this clause is required.”135
The phrase “words to that effect” . . . refers to language that conveys a general meaning
or import, in this instance the meanings of “enforceable or binding.” Under section
1123(b), the use of such language will exempt a written settlement agreement from the
general rule that documents prepared during mediation are inadmissible in future
proceedings. The Legislature’s goal was to allow parties to express their intent to be
bound in words they were likely to use, rather than requiring a legalistic formulation.
The Legislature also meant to clarify the rules governing admissibility and reduce the
likelihood that parties would overlook those rules. To meet these objectives, we must
balance the requirements of flexibility and clarity, without eroding the confidentiality that
136
is “essential to effective mediation.”

The supreme court concluded that in order to fit within the exception to
confidentiality provided by Evidence Code section 1123(b), a settlement
agreement must include a statement that is intended to be “enforceable” or
“binding.”137
E. Special Rules Related to Oral Settlement Agreements Reached in
Mediation
California Evidence Code section 1123(c) provides that an oral
settlement agreement may be admissible if it satisfies the requirements of
section 1118.138 Pursuant to Evidence Code section 1118, an oral agreement
made in accordance with section 1118 must satisfy all of the following
conditions:
(a) The oral agreement is recorded by a court reporter or reliable means of audio
139
recording.
(b) The terms of the oral agreement are recited on the record in the presence of the
parties and the mediator, and the parties express on the record that they agree to the terms
140
so recited.
(c) The parties to the oral agreement expressly state on the record that the agreement is
141
enforceable or binding . . . .

135. Id. at 197.
136. Id. (internal citations omitted) (citing Foxgate Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Bramalea Cal., Inc.,
25 P.3d 1117, 1126 (Cal. 2001); Rojas v. Superior Court, 93 P.3d 260, 265 (Cal. 2004)).
137. Fair v. Bakhtiari, 147 P.3d 653, 660 (Cal. 2006).
138. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1123(c) (West 2011).
139. Id. § 1118(a).
140. Id. § 1118(b).
141. Id. § 1118(c).
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(d) The recording is reduced to writing and the writing is signed by the parties within 72
142
hours after it is recorded.

IV. THE NONPRIVILEGED AND UNDERPROTECTED STATUS OF MEDIATION
CONFIDENTIALITY UNDER FEDERAL LAW
A. Federal Rules of Evidence 408
The starting place for understanding the federal perspective on
mediation confidentiality is the common law rule that (a) the public is
entitled to every person’s evidence, and (b) testimonial privileges are
disfavored.143 There is no federal statute, rule of procedure, or rule of
evidence that expressly recognizes or provides confidentiality protection for
communications during or in connection with a mediation. The only express
protection for settlement discussions is provided by Rule 408 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, which makes “conduct or statements made in
compromise negotiations regarding the claim” inadmissible to prove
liability.144 Thus, Rule 408 provides an admission standard for proof offered
at trial to prove liability or invalidity of a claim and speaks in terms of
relevancy. Its purpose is “to encourage the compromise and settlement of
existing disputes”145 so as to avoid “the chilling effect” that potential
disclosure might have on a party’s willingness to make a compromise offer
for fear of jeopardizing its case or defense if the matter is not settled.146
It is important to note that, by its terms, Rule 408(a) applies only to the
admissibility of evidence at trial and does not apply to discovery of
settlement negotiations or settlement terms.147 On this issue, the courts are
split as to whether Rule 408 precludes discovery.148 Moreover, Rule 408(b)
expressly provides that exclusion is not required if the “offer and
compromise” evidence is offered for a purpose that is not expressly

142. Id. § 1118(d).
143. See Jaffe v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 7 (1996).
144. FED. R. EVID. 408(b)(1)–(2).
145. Josephs v. Pac. Bell, 443 F.3d 1050, 1064 (9th Cir. 2006).
146. Molina v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., No. CV 08-04796 MMM (FMx), 2008 WL 4447678, at
*11-12 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2008).
147. See FED. R. EVID. 408(a).
148. Compare Bottaro v. Hatton Assocs., 96 F.R.D. 158, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (barring
discovery of settlement terms), with Bennett v. La Pere, 112 F.R.D. 136, 139-40 (D.R.I. 1986)
(allowing discovery of settlement discussions), and NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, 612 F. Supp. 1143, 1146 (D.D.C. 1985) (allowing discovery if information is
relevant to other issues in the pending action).
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prohibited by Rule 408(a).149 Among the “permitted uses” delineated in
Rule 408(b) are evidence of settlement and compromise negotiations offered
(1) to prove bias or prejudice on the part of a witness; (2) to prove that an
alleged wrong was committed during the negotiations (e.g., libel, assault,
unfair labor practice, etc.); (3) to negate a claim of undue delay; or (4) to
prove obstruction of a criminal investigation or prosecution. 150 Additionally,
a number of courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have concluded that Rule
408 does not make settlement offers inadmissible in the removal context
where such offers represent evidence of the amount in controversy for the
purpose of establishing the date on which such information was first made
available to the defendant and thus started the thirty-day time period for
removing a state court action to federal court. 151 Numerous district court
decisions have used the settlement letter to establish the amount in
controversy.152
In sum, Rule 408 is keenly focused on offers of compromise and
negotiations involved in making, accepting, or rejecting such offers. As
such, Rule 408 appears not to provide protection of any sort for
prenegotiation communications or exchanges of information that parties
might have with or through a mediator, even though the goal of those
discussions is to open settlement dialogue. 153

149. FED. R. EVID. 408(b).
150. Id.
151. See, Babasa v. LensCrafters, Inc., 498 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that a letter sent
by plaintiffs estimating the amount alleged put defendant on notice of the amount in controversy);
Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A settlement letter is relevant evidence of the
amount in controversy if it appears to reflect a reasonable estimate of the plaintiff’s claim.”).
152. See Munoz v. J.C. Penny Corp., No. CV09-0833 ODW (JTLx), 2009 WL 975846 (C.D.
Cal. Apr. 9, 2009) (settlement proposal letter was admissible to establish that the jurisdictional
amount in controversy had been met for purposes of removing the case to federal court); see also
Ray v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 08-5025, 2008 WL 3992644, *4 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 22, 2008)
(settlement letter used to establish the amount in controversy); Haydel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., No. CIVA 07-939-C, 2008 WL 2781472, *8, n.8 (M.D. La. July 10, 2008); Finnegan v.
Wendy’s Int’l, Inc., No. 2:08-cv-185, 2008 WL 2078068, *3 (S.D. Ohio May 13, 2008); Sulit v.
Slep-Tone Entm’t, No. C06-00045 MJJ, 2007 WL 4169762, *3, n.1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2007);
Turner v. Baker, No. 05-3298-CV-S-SWH, 2005 WL 3132325, *3 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 22, 2005);
LaPree v. Prudential Fin., 385 F. Supp. 2d 839, 849, n.9 (S.D. Iowa Aug. 17, 2005).
153. See FED. R. EVID. 408.
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B. Federal Rules of Evidence 501
The only other source of confidentiality protection in federal cases is
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 154 Rule 501 empowers the
holder of a recognized privilege to use the legal process to prevent others
from disclosing protected communications. 155 It also vests the holder with
the right to refuse to produce otherwise relevant evidence. 156 What qualifies
as a “recognized privilege” is not detailed in Rule 501.157 In federal question
cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the extent to which a privilege exists is
governed by federal common law158 and may not be augmented by local
court rules.159 In diversity cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, where state law
provides the rule of decision, the existence of a privilege is a matter of
applicable state law.160 To date, there are only two cases in the Central

154. See FED. R. EVID. 501.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. See also Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 971 F.2d 364, 367, n.10 (9th Cir. 1992).
Rule 501 raises a difficult question regarding which law shall apply in federal question cases with
pendent state law claims. In the Ninth Circuit, that question has been resolved so that the law of
privilege is governed by federal common law. See id. at n.10 (court refused to apply California
litigation privilege in copyright action with pendent state law claims); Folb v. Motion Picture Indus.
Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1169-70 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (stating that the federal
common law of privileges governs both federal and pendent state law claims in federal question
cases); see also Hancock v. Hobbs, 967 F.2d 462, 467 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (the federal law
of privilege is paramount in federal question cases even if the witness testimony is relevant to a
pendent state law count which may be controlled by a contrary state law privilege); Hancock v.
Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367, 1373 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that the federal law of privilege is paramount
to federal question cases).
159. See Facebook, Inc. v. Pac. Nw. Software, Inc., 640 F.3d 1034, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 2011) (“A
local rule, like any court order, can impose a duty of confidentiality as to any aspect of litigation,
including mediation. . . . But privileges are created by federal common law.”) In Facebook, the
Winklevosses sought to avoid enforcement of the settlement agreement between ConnectU and
Facebook which was negotiated and entered into during a private mediation. Id. at 1040. The
Winklevosses proffered evidence of what was and was not said during the mediation. Id. The
District Court for the Northern District of California excluded this evidence under its local rule that
protected such communications as “confidential information,” which the court read as creating a
“privilege” for “evidence regarding the details of the parties’ negotiations in their mediation.” Id. at
1040. While the Ninth Circuit found that the district court’s reason for excluding the evidence was
wrong, it concluded that the court was nevertheless correct in excluding the proffered evidence
because the parties had engaged with a private mediator and had signed an express written
confidentiality agreement before the mediation commenced. Id. at 1041. Accordingly, the Ninth
Circuit held that the confidentiality agreement signed by the Winklevosses precluded them from
introducing “any evidence of what Facebook said, or did not say, during the mediation.” Id.
160. FED. R. EVID. 501. See also Olam v. Cong. Mortg. Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1124-25
(N.D. Cal. 1999). That being said, federal law governs whether a case exceeds the amount in
controversy requirement. See Molina v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., No. CV 08-04796 MMM (FMx), 2008
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District of California that have recognized a federal mediation privilege to
protect communications made in conjunction with a formal mediation
proceeding: the 1998 reported decision of District Judge Paez in Folb v.
Motion Picture Industry Pension & Health Plans161 and the 2008 unreported
decision of District Judge Morrow in Molina v. Lexmark International,
Inc.162
1. Folb Decision (1998)
In Folb, a former employee complained that he had been terminated by
his employer in retaliation for whistle-blowing.163 The employer responded
that Folb was terminated because he had sexually harassed a fellow
employee named Vasquez.164 The employer and Vasquez had previously
participated in mediation in an attempt to settle Vasquez’s claims against the
company arising from Folb’s alleged harassment. 165 Folb then sought to
compel production of the mediation briefs and “related correspondence
regarding settlement negotiations” between his former employer and
Vasquez.166 Folb argued that these documents would reveal that, during
mediation, his former employer had taken the position that Folb had not
harassed Vasquez.167 The court held that Folb was entitled to discovery
regarding settlement negotiations conducted after mediation, but concluded
that a federal common law mediation privilege protected the mediation
briefs from discovery.168 The trial judge stated that the privilege applied
only to “communications between parties who agreed in writing to
participate in a confidential mediation with a neutral third party.” 169 This
WL 4447678, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2008) (citing Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348,
352 (1961)).
161. Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal.
1998).
162. Molina v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., No. CV 08-04796 MMM (FMx), 2008 WL 4447678 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 30, 2008).
163. Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1166.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1167.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1168.
168. Id. at 1167.
169. Id. at 1180. As to any other details concerning the federal mediation privilege, the trial
judge simply observed that “the contours of such a federal privilege [will have] to be fleshed out
over time.” Id. at 1179. In this regard, the trial court stressed that its recognition of a federal
mediation privilege was limited to the factual context, namely, a situation in which a third party who
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left open the question of whether a “mediation” or “settlement proceeding”
conducted as part of a federal court’s alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
program would qualify for protection without a written mediation and
confidentiality agreement between the parties.170 While such a distinction
would not be available under California law due to the broad interpretation
as to what qualifies as a mediation for purposes of confidentiality, 171 the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Facebook and the district court’s decisions in
Molina and Folb suggest that the extent to which confidentiality protections
are available in federal court matters may depend on (a) the label used to
describe the parties’ facilitated settlement efforts, (b) who is seeking to
disclose or compel disclosure, and (c) the purpose or use of the
information.172
2. Molina Decision (2008)
In Molina, Ron Molina filed a class action against his former employer,
Lexmark International, in state court in August 2005. 173 In July 2008, two
weeks before trial, Lexmark removed the case to federal court. 174 Lexmark
asserted that the court had jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act
(CAFA)—specifically 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)—which grants district courts
original jurisdiction over any civil action in which the amount in controversy
exceeds $5 million and any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a
state different from any defendant. 175 Lexmark claimed that it first became
did not participate in the mediation was seeking discovery of mediation-related communications of
the parties who did participate. Id. at 1180.
On the facts presented here, the Court concludes that communications to the mediator and
communications between parties during the mediation are protected. In addition,
communications in preparation for and during the course of a mediation with a neutral
must be protected. Subsequent negotiations between the parties, however, are not
protected even if they include information initially disclosed in the mediation.
Id.
170. See id.
171. See supra Part III.A.
172. See supra note 160; discussion infra Part IV.B.2. With regard to the label given to the
facilitated settlement effort, there are several district court decisions where courts have denied
confidentiality protection because the communications at issue did not occur in a “formal
mediation.” See, e.g., EEOC v. Albion River Inn, Inc., No. C 06-05356 SI, 2007 WL 2560718, *2
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2007); Cal. Serv. Emps. Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Advance Bldg. Maint.,
No. C06-3078 CW (BZ), 2007 WL 2669823, *1 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 7, 2007).
173. Molina v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., No. CV 08-04796 MMM (FMx), 2008 WL 4447678, at *1
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2008).
174. Id.
175. Id.
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aware that the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million in July 2008 when
it received a summary of damages prepared by Molina’s expert witness as
part of the pretrial exchange. 176 Molina filed a motion for remand, arguing
that Lexmark’s removal application was untimely because Lexmark had
been put on notice of the amount in controversy two years earlier when class
counsel shared a damages analysis during a mediation.177
The timing of removal is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) and provides
that a defendant has thirty days to file a notice of removal once he learns that
an action is removable. 178 This thirty-day period begins to run from the
defendant’s receipt of the initial pleading only when the pleading reveals, on
its face, the facts necessary for federal court jurisdiction—in Molina it was
the amount in controversy. 179 However, when the amount in controversy is
not clear on the face of the initial pleading, the thirty-day period for removal
does not begin to run until the defendant receives a copy of an amended
pleading, motion, order, or “other paper” from which it can be determined
that the case is removable. 180 The court in Molina duly noted that a
document reflecting a settlement demand in excess of the jurisdictional
minimum constitutes an “other paper” sufficient to provide notice that a case
is removable.181
The “other paper” at issue in Molina was a damages analysis prepared
by Molina’s expert which was shared during the May 2006 mediation.182
Lexmark denied receiving a copy of the damages analysis 183 and argued that,
even if it had, the federal common law mediation privilege articulated in
Folb prohibited the use of information exchanged during mediation for any
purpose.184 Alternatively, Lexmark argued that because federal court
jurisdiction was based on diversity, California’s mediation confidentiality
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at *4.
179. See Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 690-91 (9th Cir. 1997) (Ninth
Circuit joined “sister circuits” in their interpretation that 28 U.S.C. § 1446 begins to run from the
defendant’s receipt of the initial pleading when the facts reveal federal jurisdiction is necessary).
180. See Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006).
181. Molina, 2008 WL 4447678, at *4 (citing Babasa v. LensCrafters, Inc., 498 F.3d 972, 97475 (9th Cir. 2007) (settlement letter exchanged between counsel); Ambriz v. Luxury Imps. of
Sacramento Inc., No. C 08-01004 JSW, 2008 WL 1994880, *2 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2008) (settlement
demand letter); Krajca v. Southland Corp., 206 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1081-82 (D. Nev. 2002)
(settlement letter)).
182. Molina, 2008 WL 4447678, at *17.
183. Id. at *2.
184. Id. at *6.
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protections should apply—under California law, the information exchanged
was clearly protected because it was developed for and used during the
course of mediation. 185 The court rejected this latter argument because a
case that exceeds the amount in controversy requirement for federal court
jurisdiction is governed by federal law and, as such, federal privilege law
controls.186
After going through a very thorough analysis of mediation
confidentiality, the court in Molina also rejected Lexmark’s argument that
the information exchanged during the May 2006 mediation was privileged as
a matter of federal common law. 187 Looking at the decision in Folb, the
court noted that while the contours of the privilege recognized in that case
were unclear,188 the holding was expressly limited to the factual context
before the Folb court, namely, a situation in which a third party who did not
participate in the mediation was seeking discovery of mediation-related
communications for use in a different legal proceeding.189 In this context,
the court in Molina found that the issue presented in Folb was whether a
privilege shielded mediation discussions from discovery by third parties.190
The situation presented in Molina involved communications during a
mediation between disputants’ counsel regarding the amount in controversy
and raised the issue of whether a duty of confidentiality existed between the
parties that required them to keep their mediation discussions confidential.191
The court reasoned that a duty of confidentiality was distinguishable and
different from a privilege. 192
This distinction between evidentiary privilege and confidentiality helps
clarify the issue in the present case. Although “confidentiality” and
“privilege” are often used interchangeably in discussions of mediation, the
terms refer to two distinct concepts. “Confidentiality” refers to a duty to
keep information secret, while “privilege” refers to protection of information
from compelled disclosure. Communications are confidential when the
freedom of the parties to disclose them voluntarily is limited; they are
185. Id.
186. Id. (citing Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 352 (1961)). See also
LensCrafters, 498 F.3d at 974-75 (state privilege law did not apply in determining whether a
settlement letter sent in preparation for mediation was privileged and therefore not an “other
paper”); Breed v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 F.2d 1114, 1115 (9th Cir. 1976) (when a question of federal
law is at issue, state law as to privileges may provide a useful referent, but is not controlling).
187. Molina, 2008 WL 4447678, at *7.
188. Id. at *8 (“[T]he contours of such a federal privilege [will have] to be fleshed out over
time.”).
189. Id.
190. Id. at *11.
191. Id. at *10-11 (internal citations omitted).
192. Id.
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privileged when the ability of third parties to compel disclosure of them, or
testimony regarding them, is limited. Distinguishing between these concepts
in the mediation context is sometimes difficult because the relationship
between the parties to a mediation is different than the type of fiduciary
relationship that typically gives rise to an evidentiary privilege or duty of
confidentiality . . . .193
The court in Molina determined that although Lexmark argued
“mediation privilege,” it was really seeking to invoke a “duty of
confidentiality” to prevent other parties to the mediation from disclosing
mediation communications voluntarily. 194 Because of the distinction
between a privilege and a duty of confidentiality, the court reasoned that
Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provided a better reference point
for analyzing Lexmark’s confidentiality claim than did Folb.195 Similar to
the general discussion contained in Section 4(A) of this Article, the Molina
court ruled that Rule 408 does not make settlement offers inadmissible in the
removal context for purposes of establishing evidence in the amount of
controversy and, in this case, the date such information was first
communicated to the defendant. 196 In so ruling, the court noted that “parties
to a mediation generally have a duty to keep their discussions confidential,”
but concluded that this duty does not prevent use of mediation discussions
for the limited purpose of establishing the amount in controversy for
purposes of determining whether federal court jurisdiction properly exists. 197
[U]se of settlement offers as evidence of the amount in controversy has not hindered Rule
408’s goal of encouraging open and honest discussion during negotiation. This makes
sense; concern that one’s adversary will use statements during negotiation as proof of
liability or wrongdoing, not concern that it will use them as proof of the amount is
198
controversy, is the primary obstacle to forthright negotiation discussions.

3. Ninth Circuit Decisions Which Have Avoided the Issue
On at least three occasions, the Ninth Circuit has had the opportunity to
say something definitive on whether a federal mediation privilege will be
193. Id. at *10 (citing Scott H. Hughes, The Uniform Mediation Act: To the Spoiled Go the
Privileges, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 9, 25-34 (2001)).
194. Molina, 2008 WL 4447678, at *11.
195. Id.
196. Id. at *12.
197. Id.
198. Id. at *13.
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recognized in this circuit. 199 However, in all cases, it has avoided the issue!
In Dusek, a 2005 decision, the issue concerned the propriety of the
magistrate judge’s orders quashing notices of depositions and subpoenas
aimed at discovery regarding settlement negotiations in related class actions
that were settled.200 The Ninth Circuit found that because the appealing
party failed to make the requisite foundational showing that class counsel in
the settled matters had an actual or potential conflict of interest, it “need not
address whether the Ninth Circuit should recognize a federal mediation
privilege and, if so, whether it applies here.”201
In Lenscrafters, a 2007 decision, the issue was more squarely raised.202
In this case, counsel for the plaintiff class sent a letter to counsel for the
employer in preparation for an upcoming mediation. 203 The mediation did
not end in a settlement. 204 The employer then removed the action to federal
court and the plaintiff class filed a motion for remand to the state court. 205
The issue was whether the settlement letter was sufficient to put the
employer on notice that the amount in controversy exceeded federal class
action diversity jurisdiction requirements so as to support removal from state
to federal court and start the thirty-day clock running with respect to the time
in which the employer could file a notice of removal. 206 In opposing the
remand motion filed by the plaintiff class, the employer objected to the
settlement letter as evidence of notice, arguing that it was privileged under
Evidence Code section 1119. 207 The Ninth Circuit found that the
confidentiality protections provided under state law were not applicable
because federal law governs the determination of whether a case exceeds the
amount in controversy necessary for a diversity action to proceed in federal
court.208 As such, federal privilege law applied. 209 As to the existence of
any federal mediation privilege, the Ninth Circuit found that because the
employer had failed to raise that argument before the district court or in his
appellate briefs, the employer waived his right to raise the issue. 210
199. Facebook, Inc. v. Pac. Nw. Software, Inc., 640 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2011); Babasa v.
LensCrafters, Inc., 498 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2007); Dusek v. Mattel, Inc., 141 F. App’x 586 (9th Cir.
2005).
200. Dusek, 141 F. App’x at 586.
201. Id.
202. LensCrafters, 498 F.3d at 973-74.
203. Id. at 974.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 974-75.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 975 n.1.
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In Facebook, a 2011 decision, The Facebook, Inc. sought to enforce a
settlement reached during a private mediation with ConnectU, an entity
owned by the Winklevoss twins. 211 The Winklevosses sought to avoid
enforcement of the settlement agreement between ConnectU and Facebook
on the grounds that Facebook had misled them about the value of its shares
given during an exchange in which Facebook acquired all of ConnectU’s
shares.212 In support of their action to rescind the settlement, the
Winklevosses proffered evidence of what was said and not said during the
mediation.213 The District Court for the Northern District of California
excluded this evidence under its local rule that protected such
communications as “confidential information,” which the court read as
creating a “privilege” for “evidence regarding the details of the parties’
negotiations in their mediation.” 214 While the Ninth Circuit found that the
district court’s reason for excluding the evidence was wrong, it concluded
that the court was nevertheless correct in excluding the proffered evidence
because the parties had engaged a private mediator and had signed an
express, written confidentiality agreement before the mediation
commenced.215 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that the confidentiality
agreement signed by the Winklevosses precluded them from introducing
“any evidence of what Facebook said or did not say during the
mediation.”216 It is important to note that while the Ninth Circuit held that
privileges are created by federal common law and cannot be augmented by
local court rules, it also recognized that “[a] local rule, like any court order,
can impose a duty of confidentiality as to any aspect of litigation, including
mediation.”217
Consequently, there is nothing in Rule 501 that recognizes a federal
mediation privilege. 218 In fact, there is nothing in Rule 501 that specifically
recognizes any privilege.219 Privileges are matters for the federal courts to

211. Facebook, Inc. v. Pac. Nw. Software, Inc., 640 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 2011).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1040.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1041.
216. Id.
217. Id. (emphasis added).
218. FED. R. EVID. 501.
219. As discussed in Folb, Congress manifested an affirmative intention not to freeze the law of
privilege and to provide the courts with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case
basis and leave the door open for change. Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16
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define based upon considerations of public policy and may change over
time.220 Whether a privilege should exist is determined by asking whether
the need for the privilege is clear and whether the contours of the privilege
are evident so that it is appropriate for the courts to craft it in common law
fashion.221 As the district court noted in Folb, in addition to the theoretical
underpinnings of the mediation process and the long recognized policy of
favoring and encouraging settlement, in assessing a proposed privilege, a
federal court should examine whether a consistent body of state law exists
when adopting or recognizing a privilege. 222 With regard to mediation, the
district court noted that “every state in the Union, with the exception of
Delaware, has adopted a mediation privilege of one type or another.”223
Thus, it would appear that a federal mediation privilege of some sort will
eventually be recognized. 224 However, as matters stand today, that
protection does not exist. 225
4. Olam Decision (1999)226
In 1999, one year after Judge Paez’s decision in Folb, Judge Brazil in
the District Court for the Northern District of California rendered an
important decision on mediation confidentiality that has added to the
confusion in this area.227 In Olam, a borrower sued her lender for alleged
violation of the Truth in Lending Act, in addition to asserting other federal
and state law claims.228 A mediation was conducted as part of the court’s
ADR program before a member of the court’s staff. 229 A settlement was
reached and the parties signed a memorandum of understanding which
summarized the terms of settlement. 230 Thereafter, the parties attempted to
memorialize the agreement in the form of a formal settlement agreement and
request for dismissal of the lawsuit. 231 Those efforts failed. 232 Defendant
F. Supp.
(1980)).
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

2d 1164, 1170-71 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47
Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1171.
In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1154 (3d Cir. 1997).
Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1178.
Id. at 1179.
Id. at 1179-80.
Id.
Olam v. Cong. Mortg. Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
Id. at 1110.
Id, at 1115.
Id. at 1116.
Id. at 1117.
Id.
Id.
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then filed a motion seeking to enforce the original settlement as set forth in
the memorandum of understanding and to enter judgment thereon. 233
Plaintiff opposed the motion on two grounds: first, that the
memorandum of understanding was unconscionable and second, that she
was subjected to undue influence and coercion in the manner in which the
mediation was conducted. 234 In support of this latter objection, plaintiff
alleged that she was left alone in a room all day and into the early hours of
the following day while all of the mediation participants conversed in a
nearby room.235 She further claimed that: (1) she did not understand the
mediation process; (2) she felt pressured to sign the memorandum of
understanding; (3) her physical and emotional distress rendered her unduly
susceptible to being pressured; and (4) she signed the memorandum of
understanding against her will, without reading or understanding its terms.236
Defendants raised the issue of mediation confidentiality, which
prompted Judge Brazil to analyze whether that issue was to be decided as a
matter of federal or state law.237 Judge Brazil concluded that California rule
applied because the civil proceeding before the court was defendants’
motion to enforce the settlement agreement. 238 In such a proceeding, the
court reasoned, the only issue is whether an enforceable contract exists and
such a substantive question must be decided by state law because there is no
general federal law of contracts. 239 While the court concluded that
California law concerning mediation confidentiality governed whether, and
to what extent, communications and conduct occurring during the mediation
were protected from disclosure or subsequent evidentiary use, the court also
held that it was not subject to a “procedural straight jacket” and was thus
free to define its own procedure for applying California law so long as the
court’s procedure caused “no greater harm to substantive privilege interests
than California courts would be prepared to cause.”240
Judge Brazil spent a considerable amount of time reviewing California’s
mediation statutes, including the “mediator’s privilege” against giving
testimony provided by Evidence Code section 703.5 and the broad mediation

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id.
Id. at 1118.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1119.
Id.
Id. at 1121.
Id. at 1126.
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confidentiality protections provided by Evidence Code section 1119.241
However, after this review, Judge Brazil concluded that the court could
compel the mediator to testify because that was the most reliable evidence
considering the conflicting testimonies of plaintiff and defendant. 242 Judge
Brazil also reasoned that, the fact that the parties and their attorneys signed a
memorandum of understanding at the end of the mediation, California
courts—and thus him—were permitted to consider, in the context of a
hearing to determine enforceability, whether to admit evidence regarding
what was said and done during the mediation itself. 243 In determining
whether, under California law, the district court should compel the mediator
to testify despite the statutory prohibitions set forth in the aforementioned
Evidence Code sections, Judge Brazil relied on the 1998 court of appeal
decision in Rinaker v. Superior Court as standing for the broad proposition
that a mediator can be required to submit to in camera examination by a
judge and can be compelled to testify if, after in camera consideration of
what the mediator’s testimony would be, the trial judge determines that the
mediator’s testimony “might well promote significantly the public interest in
preventing perjury and the defendant’s fundamental right to a fair judicial
process.” 244 While the trial court in Rinaker did require the mediator to
testify, the factual context of that case was unique and some would argue
that the holding was limited to those special factual circumstances. 245
In Rinaker, juveniles were charged with committing vandalism—a
crime that could result in incarceration in a juvenile facility, and thus denial
of liberty.246 The victim filed a civil harassment action and a mediation was
conducted.247 During the mediation, the victim admitted that he had not
actually seen who threw the rocks at his car.248 However, at trial in the
criminal matter, the victim testified to the contrary during direct
examination.249 The minors then sought to compel the mediator’s testimony

241. Id. at 1127-28.
242. Id. at 1127.
243. Id. at 1131. Judge Brazil placed great significance on the written memorandum and stated
that “[i]f there were no signed writing, and the alleged contract was oral, California law would not
permit courts to use evidence from the mediation itself to determine whether an enforceable
agreement had been reached.” Id.
244. Id. (citing Rinaker v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 4th 155 (Ct. App. 1998)).
245. See Foxgate Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 25 P.3d 1117 (Cal. 2001) (“[T]he
only California case upholding admission, over objection, of statements made during mediation in
which no statutory exception to confidentiality applied, was Rinaker v. Superior Court . . . .”).
246. Rinaker, 62 Cal. App. 4th at 161-62.
247. Id. at 162.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 162, 169.

92

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol12/iss1/2

30

Callahan: Mediation Confidentiality: For California Litigants, Why Should M

[Vol. 12: 63, 2012]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

to impeach the victim’s testimony in the delinquency proceedings;250
however, the trial court denied the motion. 251 The court of appeal reversed,
holding that the confidentiality provisions of Evidence Code section 1119
must yield when necessary to ensure the minors’ constitutional right to
effective cross examination and impeachment of an adverse witness in a
juvenile delinquency proceeding. 252 The court reasoned that neither the
witness nor the mediator had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding
inconsistent statements made during the mediation because it has long been
established that, when balanced against the competing goals of preventing
perjury and preserving the integrity of the truth-seeking process of a juvenile
delinquency proceeding, the interest in promoting settlements must yield to
the minors’ constitutional right to effective impeachment.253
The Supreme Court of California precedent discussed above did not
exist at the time Olam was decided.254 Such precedent clearly states that it is
not for the courts to craft judicial exceptions to the broad confidentiality
protections which have been provided by statute. 255 Essentially, what Judge
Brazil did was craft a judicial exception. 256 One can only wonder if Judge
Brazil would have decided this case differently in the face of the Foxgate,
Rojas, Simmons and Cassel decisions if presented with the Olam facts today.
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS REGARDING MEDIATION CONFIDENTIALITY
There are several noteworthy “take aways” from the foregoing
comparison of the confidentiality protections available to California litigants
depending on whether they are in state or federal court. First, the
importance of confidentiality as a defining feature and essential ingredient of
mediation seems to exist under both state and federal law. 257 However, the
scope of protection each system is willing to allow appears to represent the
brightest line of demarcation between California’s state and federal courts.
Both are oriented towards “fairness of process,” but have a different
250. Id. at 162.
251. Id. at 161.
252. Id. at 160-61.
253. Id.
254. Compare Cassel v. Superior Court, 244 P.3d 1080, 1090 (Cal. 2011), with Olam v. Cong.
Mortg. Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
255. Cassel, 244 P.3d at 1088.
256. Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1110.
257. See supra Part III (discussing California’s strict confidentiality scheme); supra Part IV
(discussing the nonprivileged status of mediation confidentiality under federal law).
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emphasis. California courts focus on the process by making it clear what
protection shall be afforded when disputants utilize mediation in an effort to
resolve their differences. 258 Additionally, California courts have made it
clear that the scope of protection shall be broadly construed because the
legislature chose to enact a statute detailing exceptions to confidentiality that
are quite narrow.259 Through the Facebook and Molina decisions, the focus
appears to be on the participants.260 Both cases suggest that federal courts
could “tolerate” a duty of confidentiality between or among the participants
in a mediation, provided there are exceptions which would allow the court to
step in to redress any abuses (e.g. fraud, duress, coercion, or some other
outcome that would constitute a miscarriage of justice). 261
A second “take away” is that while California’s confidentiality
protections have been stated in the form of an evidence exclusion provision,
California courts have construed this provision more like a privilege held by
all participants which operates as a bar to compelling disclosure, discovery,
or testimony without everyone’s consent. While the Folb and Molina
decisions acknowledged that confidentiality is an important and integral part
of the mediation process, in neither case was the court willing to stake out a
general rule for broad application. 262 Instead, both decisions ultimately

258. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1115(c) (defining the processes that qualify for confidentiality
protections).
259. Doe 1 v. Superior Court (Archdiocese Case), 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 248 (Ct. App. 2005).
260. See Molina v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., No. CV 08-04796 MMM (FMx), 2008 WL 4447678
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2008); Facebook, Inc. v. Pac. Nw. Software, Inc., 640 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2011).
261. See Molina, 2008 WL 4447678; Facebook, 640 F.3d 1034. The recently revised Local
Rules of the United States District Court for the Central District of California provide an example of
such qualified tolerance:
[T]his Court, the mediator, all counsel and parties, and any other persons attending the
mediation shall treat as “confidential information” the contents of the written mediation
statements, any documents prepared for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to
the mediation, anything that happened or was said relating to the subject matter of the
case in mediation, any position taken, and any view of the merits of the case expressed by
any participant in connection with any mediation. “Confidential information” shall not
be: (1) disclosed to anyone not involved in the litigation; [or] (2) disclosed to the
assigned judges . . . .
C.D. Cal. R. 16-15.8(a). But see C.D. Cal. R. 16-15.9 (allowing any judge or magistrate to dispense
with the foregoing confidentiality protections “as the judge, in his or her discretion, determines to be
appropriate”).
262. See Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, (C.D. Cal.
1998); Molina, 2008 WL 4447678, at *16. See also discussion supra Parts IV.B.1–2.
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concluded that whether, when, and to what degree confidentiality protection
is available will depend on the facts of the case.263
A third “take away” is that Facebook presented the Ninth Circuit with
an opportunity to recognize a “duty of confidentiality” based upon the
northern district’s local rule. The Ninth Circuit did not need to mention the
local rule because the mediation at issue was not conducted through the
court’s ADR program. However, since the court did mention the rule, it
could have affirmed the lower court’s exclusion of evidence based upon a
finding of a duty of confidentiality since the underlying dispute was the
subject of litigation venued in the northern district. 264 Recognizing such a
duty of confidentiality based upon the court’s policies and treatment per its
local rules may have only been dicta in the context of the case before the
court, but it nevertheless would have advanced the ball in terms of
validating—at the federal level—the notion that some level of
confidentiality protection should be afforded communications during a
mediation, especially for mediations conducted through the federal court’s
ADR program.265
A fourth “take away” from the Facebook decision is that parties to a
mediation pending in federal court, or related to an existing or future federal
court action, should execute a written confidentiality agreement covering
anything the mediation participants might say or do during the course or in
furtherance of the mediation. This makes sense considering the Ninth
Circuit precluded the Winklevosses from introducing “any evidence of what
Facebook said, or did not say, during the mediation” because they had
signed a confidentiality agreement with respect to the mediation. 266 Such
agreements, however, are only contracts and therefore bind only those
persons who are parties to the agreement. This means third-party litigants

263. See Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164; Molina, 2008 WL 447678, at *14. See also discussion
supra Parts IV.B.1, IV.B.2.
264. See Facebook, 640 F.3d at 1036.
265. Under the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-52, all federal
courts are required to provide civil litigants with at least one ADR process, including but not limited
to mediation. 28 U.S.C. § 652(a). In connection with these programs, the district courts must adopt
local rules that provide for the confidentiality of the ADR process and “prohibit disclosure of
confidential dispute resolution communications.” 28 U.S.C. § 652(d). As such, the Ninth Circuit
would not have been stepping out on much of a limb by validating the confidentiality protections
provided under the northern district’s local rule. See 28 U.S.C. § 652(d) (requiring that district
courts must adopt local rules that prohibit disclosure of confidential dispute resolution
communications).
266. Facebook, 640 F.3d at 1040.
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are not bound and can nevertheless seek to compel disclosure by the
mediation participants by service of a subpoena.
A final “take away” is that confidentiality is an essential and integral
part of mediation. It encourages the exchange of information between the
parties and promotes problem-solving and interest-based negotiations, which
can yield more durable settlements. Doubts about the existence or scope of
confidentiality protections cannot help but lead to less sharing, less
willingness to develop information for use in mediation, less work in joint
sessions, more work in private caucuses, and more indirect communications
through the mediator so as to preserve deniability. As this area of the law
continues to develop, it will require a balancing of interests between
mediation participants, courts charged with overseeing these disputes, thirdparty litigants, and the public.
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